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FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE TO WIN THE WAR:  
CAN STATES COMBAT DOMESTIC MINOR SEX 
TRAFFICKING DESPITE CDA PREEMPTION? 
Stephanie Silvano* 
 
The explosion of the internet and online communication has led to an 
alarming increase in an existing epidemic:  domestic minor sex trafficking.  
Sex traffickers utilize websites, such as Backpage.com, to post trafficking 
advertisements depicting minors, which are minimally regulated as a result 
of the civil immunity provision of the Communications Decency Act (47 
U.S.C. § 230).  This immunity provision has been interpreted broadly by the 
courts, granting expansive immunity to websites as both publishers and 
distributors of content. 
In an effort to combat minor sex trafficking at a local level, some state 
legislatures enacted statutes criminalizing the knowing publication of 
online commercial sex advertisements depicting minors.  Backpage.com 
challenged these statutes in district courts with great success.  Because 
these statutes could hold websites liable for the publication of third-party 
content, the courts enjoined the laws as preempted by the Communications 
Decency Act.  Thus, preemption places the states in a lose-lose situation:  
states can enact legislation knowing that the legislation will likely be 
enjoined or attempt to litigate against websites with little promise for 
success. 
This Note argues that courts should narrow the scope of § 230’s 
immunity given changes in technology and the increase in offensive and 
illegal content online.  This Note also argues for the enactment of a new 
federal criminal statute, in place of individual state legislation, which 
would put liability back in the right hands and avoid preemption, while 
reducing domestic minor sex trafficking online. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At only fourteen years old, she worked twelve hours a day servicing 
―johns‖ she would meet at local hotels.1  A runaway, she was lured into 
prostitution at a time when she was young and vulnerable and was trapped 
thereafter with threats and beatings.  To find customers, her pimp posted 
advertisements, complete with suggestive subject lines2 and provocative 
pictures of her body, at Backpage.com with a price tag:  $300 an hour.  She 
never saw a dime. 
Stories such as these, though sickening, are all too familiar.3  With the 
growth of the internet, sex traffickers are looking to a new channel for 
advertising prostitution:  Backpage.com, a free online classifieds website 
with an active ―adult‖ section.  The site features thousands of 
advertisements that include provocative pictures of women and vague 
descriptions of their adult services.4  Although each advertisement lists the 
poster‘s age, the ages are often incorrect and many advertisements are 
actually promoting the prostitution and escort services of minors. 
In response to the expansion of online sex trafficking on these sites, some 
states such as Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey enacted legislation 
that effectively imposes criminal liability on sites that knowingly publish 
underage escort advertisements.5  In recent federal litigation, Backpage.com 
battled with the states over whether this new legislation is constitutionally 
valid6 or preempted by the Communications Decency Act7 (CDA).  
Although the district courts in Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey all 
 
 1. This story is fictitious, adapted from stories featured in a series of news articles 
written after arrests of criminals who used Backpage.com for sex trafficking. See, e.g., 
SHARED HOPE INT‘L, MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING VIA BACKPAGE.COM CASES (2013), 
http://www.azgovernor.gov/HTTF/documents/Materials/HTTF_091113_BackpageCases090
513.pdf (providing synopses of 232 cases throughout the United States involving minor sex 
trafficking on Backpage.com); Amber Lyon & Steve Turnham, Underage Sex Trade Still 
Flourishing Online, CNN (Feb. 5, 2011, 3:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/ 
01/20/siu.selling.girl.next.door.backpage. 
 2. These suggestive subject lines flood the pages of Backpage.com‘s adult section.  
Many subject lines and advertisements are filled with code words and falsified ages, thereby 
disguising sex trafficking to the typical keyword scanner or untrained eye.  For examples of 
these promiscuous advertisements, see Brief for Defendants at Ex. A, Backpage.com, LLC v. 
Hoffman, No. 13-03952 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013), 2013 WL 4502097 [hereinafter Hoffman 
Defendants‘ Brief] (―DIAMOND here let‘s shine together – 19.‘ . . . ‗KILLER 
CURVES . . . – 24.‖). 
 3. See SHARED HOPE INT‘L, supra note 1 (discussing 232 cases of minor sex trafficking 
via the internet). 
 4. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at Ex. A. 
 5. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315 (West 
2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104 (West 2012) (repealed 2013). 
 6. See generally Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097; Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. 
Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 
(W.D. Wash. 2012). 
 7. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).  The Communications Decency Act (CDA), or Title V 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, was Congress‘s first attempt at regulating liability 
and content on the internet and provides civil immunity for websites and other interactive 
computer services that publish information provided by third parties. See id.  The CDA also 
expressly preempts any state laws inconsistent with the federal statute.  A more complete 
discussion of the history and effects of the CDA can be found in Part I.B. 
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enjoined this legislation, forty-nine attorneys general are still fighting to 
combat sex trafficking online.8 
The litigation in these district courts poses an important question:  are 
these new state statutes actually preempted by the CDA?  Backpage.com 
argues that the broad immunity provided by the CDA preempts the 
legislation enacted to criminalize the knowing dissemination of minor sex 
trafficking advertisements.9  In response, the states argue that the CDA only 
preempts inconsistent state laws, and thus the statutes in question are not 
preempted.10  Although the courts ruled in favor of Backpage.com and 
enjoined the legislation, the litigation raised important issues over the 
existence and extent of CDA immunity.11  As a result of this conflict, 
suggestions of an amendment to the CDA to remove this immunity 
produced spirited debate by many interested parties.12 
This Note argues that CDA preemption creates unnecessary barriers to 
reform that could help to eliminate one of the largest channels of child 
trafficking, online classifieds.13  The internet has exploded over the last two 
decades and is now widely used in society as an outlet for speech and 
creativity.14  While internet discourse must be protected, the answer is not 
 
 8. See Letter from Att‘ys Gen. to Congress (July 23, 2013) [hereinafter Att‘ys Gen. 
Letter], available at http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/Final%20CDA%20Sign% 
20On%20Letter.pdf . 
 9. See Brief for Plaintiff at 17, Hoffman, No. 13-03952, 2013 WL 4502097 [hereinafter 
Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief]; Brief for Plaintiff at 9, Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (No. 12-
00065) [hereinafter Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief]; Brief for Plaintiff at 8, McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 
2d 1262 (No. 12-00954) [hereinafter McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief]; infra Part II.B.1. 
 10. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 11; see also Brief for Defendants at 
13, Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (No. 12-00065) [hereinafter Cooper Defendants‘ Brief]; 
Brief for Defendants at 9–10, McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (No. 12-00954) [hereinafter 
McKenna Defendants‘ Brief]; infra Part II.B.2. 
 11. Backpage.com also raises meritorious constitutional arguments, but preemption by 
the CDA immunizes the site before these important questions are reached.  By creating an 
initial obstacle for states in enacting legislation, the debate over preemption effectively 
determines whether and how states can take action to combat trafficking on a local level. 
 12. See, e.g., Matt Zimmerman, State AGs Ask Congress to Gut Critical CDA 230 
Online Speech Protections, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 24, 2013), https://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2013/07/state-ags-threaten-gut-cda-230-speech-protections (arguing to keep CDA 
immunity for interactive computer services intact). But see Petition to the U.S. Senate, 
Amend Communications Decency Act Section 230, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/ 
petitions/the-u-s-senate-amend-communications-decency-act-section-230 (last visited Sept. 
21, 2014) (asking supporters to sign petition in support of amending the CDA to reduce 
immunity for interactive computer services). 
 13. See MARK LATONERO, HUMAN TRAFFICKING ONLINE:  THE ROLE OF SOCIAL 
NETWORKING SITES AND ONLINE CLASSIFIEDS 19 (2001), available at 
https://technologyandtrafficking.usc.edu/files/2011/09/HumanTrafficking_FINAL.pdf 
(examining the impact of technology on sex trafficking and its prevalence online). 
 14. See Carl Johnson, The Internet:  Can’t Live Without It, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2011, 4:31 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/carljohnson/2011/11/02/the-internet-cant-live-without-it 
(discussing a 2011 Cisco study finding that more than 50 percent of respondents between 
ages 18 and 29 claimed they could not live without internet access); see also Ryan Dalton, 
Note, Abolishing Child Sex Trafficking on the Internet:  Imposing Criminal Culpability on 
Digital Facilitators, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2013) (observing that the internet has 
become more accessible than ever before as a majority of American adults own a computer, 
cell phone, or other device). 
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such expansive immunity.  Because the internet is mature and websites can 
now better adapt to regulation, expansive immunity will no longer stunt free 
speech and online commerce.15  As a result, civil immunity should be 
narrowed, but criminal liability should be strengthened to punish criminal 
activity online.  Thus, a change in the current law is necessary to reduce 
minor trafficking by criminalizing the knowing publication from the 
source—sites like Backpage.com. 
This Note examines the conflicting arguments regarding CDA 
preemption of these state criminal laws and explores the differing judicial 
interpretations of CDA immunity among the circuit courts, while also 
identifying possible solutions for states in the face of CDA preemption.  
Part I provides background information on online sex trafficking, the 
history of the CDA, and the law of preemption.  Part II examines the 
current state legislation and Backpage.com litigation that has raised 
important preemption concerns.  Part III focuses on the current conflict 
regarding the interpretation of CDA immunity and explores the potential 
alternatives for states in the face of CDA preemption.  Finally, Part IV 
argues that a narrower interpretation of immunity and a new federal 
criminal statute are necessary to effectively combat domestic minor sex 
trafficking nationwide. 
I.   A PRIMER ON SEX TRAFFICKING, PREEMPTION, AND THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
As explained in greater detail below, online classifieds have become one 
of the major channels of minor sex trafficking.  Part I.A explores the current 
landscape of sex trafficking with respect to online classifieds, illustrating 
the extensiveness of the nationwide problem.  Part I.B reviews the history 
and purpose of the CDA and its impact on internet regulation.  Part I.C 
provides an overview of preemption and its use by the courts. 
A.   Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking and the Internet 
Minor sex trafficking is a growing problem in America, and the internet 
is one of the primary channels traffickers use to find customers.16  Part 
I.A.1 defines minor sex trafficking and illustrates its prevalence in the 
United States.  Part I.A.2 then explains online classifieds and how these 
sites are used as channels for sex trafficking. 
 
 15. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir. 
2008) (―The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that could easily be 
smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws.‖). 
 16. See LINDA A. SMITH ET AL., SHARED HOPE INT‘L, THE NATIONAL REPORT ON 
DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING:  AMERICA‘S PROSTITUTED CHILDREN 19 (2009), 
available at http://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/SHI_National_Report_ 
on_DMST_2009.pdf. 
380 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
1.   Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking 
In the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), Congress 
defined sex trafficking as ―the recruitment, harboring, transportation, 
provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex 
act.‖17  The United States is a ―source, transit, and destination country for 
men, women, and children . . . subjected to sex trafficking and forced 
labor.‖18  Experts estimate that more than 100,000 American children are 
victimized through sex trafficking in America each year.19  This does not 
include foreign children who are victims of trafficking in the United States 
or victims over the age of eighteen.20 
In an effort to protect victims of all ages, Congress enacted the TVPA—
the first federal law enacted to protect victims and prosecute perpetrators of 
trafficking.21  The TVPA creates a framework for the prevention of 
victimization and protection of victims, while establishing minimum 
standards for governments to help eliminate trafficking.22  The TVPA also 
strengthens prosecution and punishment of traffickers by addressing the 
interpretation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.23  Although this 
statute and its framework are a step toward a solution, ambiguity in the 
TVPA‘s application leaves room for improvement, as domestic minor sex 
trafficking remains a growing issue.24  Accordingly, states enacted new 
laws to help fight domestic minor sex trafficking that criminalize 
commercial sex advertisements depicting minors.25 
2.   Online Classifieds 
Since the expansion of the internet, a number of classified advertising 
websites have developed and are now a popular alternative to traditional 
print advertising in newspapers.26  Sites like Craigslist, Backpage.com, and 
 
 17. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2012). 
 18. U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT JUNE 2014 397 (2014), 
available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/index.htm. 
 19. SMITH ET AL., supra note 16, at 4 (quoting Ernie Allen from the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children who noted that ―[t]he best estimates, the best data, suggests 
that . . . at least [] 100,000 American kids a year are victimized through the practice of child 
prostitution‖). 
 20. See id. 
 21. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–09 (2012). 
 22. Id. §§ 7104–07. 
 23. Id. § 7109. 
 24. Misperceptions of the definition of sex trafficking under the TVPA and confusion 
regarding its practical application have weakened the law‘s efficacy. See SMITH ET AL., supra 
note 16, at 7.  Further, the general public does not fully understand the issue and its 
prevalence in American society. See id.  Although many children are runaways or part of the 
child welfare system, some are recruited from middle class families as well, illustrating the 
widespread scope of domestic minor sex trafficking. See id. at 9. 
 25. See infra Part II.A. 
 26. See Jeff Bercovici, Sorry, Craig:  Study Finds Craigslist Took $5 Billion From 
Newspapers, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2013, 7:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/ 
2013/08/14/sorry-craig-study-finds-craigslist-cost-newspapers-5-billion/ (discussing a recent 
study which found that Craigslist is an inexpensive online alternative to traditional print 
advertising and cost print newspapers $5 billion in revenue from 2000 to 2007). 
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eBay Classifieds provide users with a forum for buying and selling goods 
and services to a broader audience on the web.27  These websites group 
advertisements by location and category, similar to print advertisements.28  
The use of these websites has grown exponentially as internet use 
increases.29 
Each website boasts a broad array of categories from appliances to 
roommates to job postings.30  Many websites, however, also feature an 
―adult services‖ section with opportunities for users to post advertisements 
offering or requesting sexual services.31  These websites have come under 
scrutiny for featuring adult classifieds because many postings are actually 
for the prostitution of women and children.32 
Websites, including online classified sites like Backpage.com, have 
become one of the primary channels of sex trafficking.33  This is in part due 
to technological advances on the internet that make information easily 
accessible and provide a forum for anonymity, which allows traffickers to 
post advertisements of minors for a world of customers to see with ease and 
security.34  Only a few years ago, Craigslist was the leader in prostitution 
advertising online.35  But, pressure from several state attorneys general led 
Craigslist to eliminate its adult services section.36  Although some argued 
that this decision reduced the market for prostitution and trafficking online, 
 
 27. See LATONERO, supra note 13, at 12–13. 
 28. See id.; see also BACKPAGE, http://www.backpage.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014); 
CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014); EBAY CLASSIFIEDS, 
http://www.ebayclassifieds.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
 29. See LATONERO, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that the percentage of online American 
adults that reported using sites such as Craigslist increased from 32 percent in 2007 to 53 
percent in 2010). 
 30. See, e.g., BACKPAGE, supra note 28; CRAIGSLIST, supra note 28; EBAY CLASSIFIEDS, 
supra note 28. 
 31. See, e.g., BACKPAGE, supra note 28; CITYVIBE, http://www.cityvibe.com (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2014); EROS, http://www.eros.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014); MYREDBOOK, 
http://www.myredbook.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (seized by the FBI and IRS for 
money laundering based on prostitution).  These websites all feature online classified 
advertisements for adult services.  However, there are many other sites that host online 
classifieds of adult services that may go undetected, as many traffickers use code words and 
other tactics to post advertisements in other areas of classified websites (such as massage 
services) or to pass company keyword searches. See LATONERO, supra note 13, at 19. 
 32. See David A. Lieb, Online Sex Ads Draw Scrutiny, SEACOASTONLINE (Sept. 30, 
2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20130930-BIZ-309300303. 
 33. See generally SHARED HOPE INT‘L, supra note 1 (listing 232 reported cases of sex 
trafficking via Backpage.com in forty-five states over the last several years); Abigail Kuzma, 
A Letter to Congress:  The Communications Decency Act Promotes Human Trafficking, 34 
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 23, 27 (2013) (noting that websites such as Backpage.com have 
created ―virtual brothels‖ for child sex trafficking). 
 34. See Dalton, supra note 14, at 1108. 
 35. See Backpage Replaces Craigslist as Prostitution-Ad Leader, AIM GROUP (Oct. 19, 
2010) [hereinafter AIM GROUP 2010], http://aimgroup.com/2010/10/19/backpage-replaces-
craigslist-as-prostitution-ad-leader. 
 36. See Christopher Leonard, Craigslist Adult Services Section REMOVED, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 4, 2010, 11:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/04/ 
craigslist-adult-services_0_n_705758.html. 
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in reality many of these ads migrated to other websites including 
Backpage.com.37 
Backpage.com is now the leader in adult services advertising and is 
facing the same pressure as Craigslist encountered only a few years ago.38  
In the month following Craigslist‘s decision, Backpage.com saw its revenue 
increase 15.3 percent due to the migration of adult advertisements to new 
channels.39  Recent studies estimate that Backpage.com‘s monthly revenue 
from its online escort and ―body rub‖ sections, which host many suspected 
prostitution and sex trafficking advertisements, is more than $4 million.40  
These profits are derived in part from the fee Backpage.com currently 
charges for posting adult advertisements, though this fee differs by category 
and location.41  In order to post an adult advertisement on Backpage.com, a 
user must enter a title, age, description, and email.42  Users may upload up 
to twelve images, though this is not required.43  After completing this form 
and choosing the frequency of the posting, the user must enter valid credit 
card information to purchase the advertisement.44  After review,45 the 
advertisement is published on Backpage.com. 
This increase in prostitution advertising on Backpage.com led attorneys 
general to ask the site to remove its adult services section, a request that 
Backpage.com has continuously refused.46  Rather than eliminate its 
 
 37. See Marissa Louie, Craigslist Saga:  Sex Ads Get Pushed Elsewhere, but Kroobe 
Says No, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2010, 3:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
marissa-louie/craigslist-saga-sex-ads-g_b_798043.html (noting that sex advertisements have 
migrated to Backpage.com, Oodle, and eBay‘s LoQuo.com following Craigslist‘s removal of 
its adult services section). 
 38. According to a recent study by the AIM Group, a consulting group that researches 
interactive media and classified advertising, Backpage.com generated 82.3 percent of the 
estimated revenue from online prostitution advertising from June 2012 to May 2013. Online 
Prostitution-Ad Revenue Crosses Craigslist Benchmark, AIM GROUP (July 10, 2013) 
[hereinafter AIM GROUP 2013], http://aimgroup.com/2013/07/10/online-prostitution-ad-
revenue-crosses-craigslist-benchmark.  These statistics illustrate Backpage.com‘s growth in 
the illicit advertising market. See id. 
 39. AIM GROUP 2010, supra note 35. 
 40. AIM GROUP 2013, supra note 38.  The AIM Group acknowledges its use of 
estimations in its data collection and the potential inaccuracies in its results given that the 
study only researched select markets where Backpage.com is localized. See id.  However, 
the study still provides a helpful illustration of the prevalence of prostitution and trafficking 
online and how websites profit from such illicit activity. Id. 
 41. For example, advertisements for escort services in northern New Jersey cost $12.00 
per posting, with higher fees charged regularly for highlighted or repeated postings. See 
North Jersey, N.J., BACKPAGE, http://posting.northjersey.backpage.com/online/ 
classifieds/PostAdPPI.html/nnj/northjersey.backpage.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (click 
―adult entertainment‖; ―escorts‖; ―North Jersey‖; ―Continue‖).  In contrast, escort 
advertisements in Provo, Utah, cost only $3.00 per advertisement. See Provo, Utah, 
BACKPAGE, http://posting.provo.backpage.com/online/classifieds/PostAdPPI.html/pvu/ 
provo.backpage.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (click ―adult entertainment‖; ―escorts‖; 
―Provo‖; ―Continue‖). 
 42. See North Jersey, N.J., supra note 41. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
 46. See Martha Kessler, Backpage Calls for National Taskforce to Study Prevention of 
Illegal Online Ads, 15 Elec. Com. & L. Rep. 16–19 (BNA) (Oct. 27, 2010). 
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lucrative adult services section, Backpage.com purports to have taken steps 
to combat online prostitution and trafficking.47  In a recent article, 
Backpage.com General Counsel Liz McDougall discussed the steps 
Backpage.com has taken to screen advertisements for illicit activity.48  
McDougall claimed that employees remove more than one million 
advertisements from the site every month, approximately 18,000 of which 
are from the adult category.49  After running all classified advertisements 
through a keyword filter, McDougall asserted that Backpage.com employs a 
team of 110 employees to manually review each advertisement submitted to 
the adult category.50  The priority of employees during the review process is 
to look for minors and illegal activity.51  Since implementing this system, 
McDougall claimed that Backpage.com reports to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children approximately 400 advertisements each 
month that it suspects involve a minor .52 
Although the review process may appear comprehensive and effective, 
with multiple reviews and reports to national agencies, employees review 
posts subjectively based on their own estimates of age and legality.53  
Consequently, many cases of minor sex trafficking may go unreported if the 
particular employee reviewer guesses that the person depicted is over 
eighteen.  Further, Backpage.com‘s Terms of Use do not prohibit users 
from posting on behalf of another individual, which permits traffickers to 
post on behalf of their victims, possibly without detection.54  Accordingly, 
many minor sex trafficking advertisements—and victims—go undetected. 
B.   The Communications Decency Act of 1996 
The Communications Decency Act of 199655 was one of Congress‘s first 
attempts at regulating the new and growing internet medium.  Part I.B.1 
explains the state of the law before the enactment of the CDA.  Part I.B.2 
discusses the history and purpose of the legislation.  Part I.B.3 clarifies the 
distinction between interactive computer services and information content 
providers.  Part I.B.4 examines the exceptions to § 230 immunity. 
 
 47. See Julie Ruvolo, Sex Trafficking on Backpage.com:  Much Ado About (Statistically) 
Nothing, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Oct. 6, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/06/sex-
trafficking-on-backpage-com-much-ado-about-statistically-nothing/.  Google claims to 
screen advertisements through both automated and manual review as well. See Kessler, 
supra note 46. 
 48. See Ruvolo, supra note 47. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id.  Employees review advertisements once before publishing, and then a 
different group of employees reviews the advertisements again after going live on the site. 
See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id.; see also Terms, BACKPAGE.COM, http://www.backpage.com/ 
online/TermsOfUse (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
 55. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
384 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
1.   Before the Communications Decency Act 
Before Congress enacted the CDA in 1996, the internet was a new 
medium and regulation was minimal.56  Legal liability for user-generated 
content was not considered by courts or legislatures until 1995, when a New 
York State Supreme Court examined whether an online publisher could be 
held liable for defamatory statements made by a third party in Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy.57  Defendant Prodigy, the owner and operator of 
a computer network, produced the online bulletin board ―Money Talk.‖58  A 
third-party user made allegedly defamatory statements about plaintiff 
Stratton Oakmont, a securities firm.59  The court held that Prodigy was a 
―publisher‖ because ―[b]y actively utilizing technology and manpower to 
delete notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of 
offensiveness . . . PRODIGY is clearly making decisions as to 
content . . . and such decisions constitute editorial control.‖60  Therefore, 
Prodigy was a publisher for the purposes of plaintiff‘s libel claims.61 
2.   The Communications Decency Act 
In response to Stratton Oakmont, Congress enacted § 230 of the CDA.62  
Section 230 provides immunity in two ways to interactive computer 
services, defined as an ―information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server.‖63.  First, under the CDA no interactive computer service 
may be treated as the publisher or speaker of third-party content.64  Second, 
interactive computer services are immune from civil liability if they 
voluntarily take action to restrict access to obscene and objectionable 
 
 56. See KrisAnn Norby-Jahner, Comment, “Minor” Online Sexual Harassment and the 
CDA § 230 Defense:  New Directions for Internet Service Provider Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 207, 234 (2009) (―Before the CDA was enacted, courts had to deal with legal claims in 
the Internet medium without legislative guidance.  Using common-law principles, the courts 
applied publishing and distributing standards to online claims.‖). 
 57. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, 
at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See John E. D. Larkin, Criminal and Civil Liability for User Generated Content:  
Craigslist, A Case Study, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL‘Y 85, 104 (2010). 
 63. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012). 
 64. Id. § 230(c)(1) (―No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.‖).  Although some argue that § 230 only confers publisher immunity and 
does not impact distributor liability, the majority of courts have not recognized this 
distinction. See, e.g., David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. 
REV. 147, 167–72 (1997); David Lukmire, Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications 
Decency Act?:  The Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 371, 389–90 (2010).  Whether distributor liability remains intact is not considered in this 
Note. 
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content online.65  This effectively repudiated Stratton Oakmont and 
drastically departed from traditional defamation jurisprudence at common 
law.66 
Although the statute was a legislative response to the Stratton Oakmont 
decision, the purpose of the CDA as stated in the statutory text is ―to 
promote the continued development of the Internet . . . [and] to preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.‖67  At the time, the 
internet was in its infancy and Congress feared that the new technology 
would be stifled by burdensome regulations and litigation.68  The CDA was 
intended in part to promote the prosperity of the internet as a medium and a 
marketplace.69 
However, the CDA‘s purpose is twofold—Congress also recognized the 
challenges that the internet presented in policing obscene content and 
preventing children‘s access to objectionable material online.70  Therefore, 
Congress enacted the CDA ―to remove disincentives for the development 
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents 
to restrict their children‘s access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material‖ and ―to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to 
deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by 
means of computer.‖71  These two reasons behind the CDA, as listed in the 
statutory text,72 indicate that Congress was also concerned with protecting 
children.73 
 
 65. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) describes civil liability: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of— (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken 
to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical 
means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 
Based on an expansive interpretation of the ―interactive computer service‖ definition, courts 
have construed these immunity provisions to provide broad immunity to websites and other 
online operators facing both criminal and civil liability. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 66. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 104.  The publisher or distributor‘s level of control 
over the defamatory material determines liability for third-party content in common law 
defamation cases.  Under the common law of torts, ―one who only delivers or transmits 
defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows 
or has reason to know of its defamatory character.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 
(1977).  Courts have held traditional print media outlets liable for the knowing publication of 
defamatory or criminal third-party content, which directly contradicts Congress‘s decision 
for websites in the CDA. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (N.D. Ill. 
2009) (noting that print newspapers and magazines may be held liable for publishing 
advertisements that harm third parties (citing Braun v. Soldier of Fortune, 968 F.2d 1110, 
1114 (11th Cir. 1992))). 
 67. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. § 230(b)(4). 
 71. Id. § 230(b)(4)–(5). 
 72. Section 230(b) lists the policy reasons behind Congress‘s decision to enact the CDA: 
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3.   Interactive Computer Services and Information Content Providers 
The distinction between ―interactive computer services‖ and 
―information content providers‖ is critical to determine immunity.74  The 
statute defines an interactive computer service as ―any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a 
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems 
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.‖75  
Using this definition, courts have recognized that interactive computer 
services include a wide range of websites and services other than just 
internet services providers.76  For example, courts have found that eBay, 
Amazon.com, America Online, Inc. (AOL), and other websites that host 
third-party content are interactive computer services.77 
 
(1)  to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services and other interactive media; (2)  to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3)  to encourage the 
development of technologies which maximize user control over what information 
is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other 
interactive computer services; (4)  to remove disincentives for the development 
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to 
restrict their children‘s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; 
and (5)  to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer. 
Id. § 230(b).  These provisions illuminate the reasons behind Congress‘s choices in drafting 
§ 230. See id. 
 73. See 141 CONG. REC. 15,502–05 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 22,044–46 (1995).  
Congress enacted an additional section of the CDA to fulfill its purpose of protecting 
children and reducing obscenity in response to the increasing presence of online sex sales 
and pornography online. See Abby R. Perer, Note, Policing the Virtual Red Light District:  A 
Legislative Solution to the Problems of Internet Prostitution and Sex Trafficking, 77 BROOK. 
L. REV. 823, 831 (2012).  Section 223(a) criminalizes the knowing transmission of obscene 
images to any person under the age of 18, and § 223(d) forbids the knowing sending of any 
message ―that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.‖ Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859–60 (1997) (discussing § 223 and the provisions under scrutiny in 
the litigation).  The Supreme Court invalidated § 223 in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844.  In its 
analysis, the Court distinguished the internet from other types of media and examined the 
text of the statute in this context. Id. at 870.  The Court noted that the distinctions between 
the internet and broadcast media meant that precedent provides no basis for qualifying the 
level of First Amendment scrutiny in this case. Id.  Ultimately, the Court held that § 223 was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id. at 870–85.  Although the decision removed 
the provision of the CDA that most clearly protected children from online obscenity, both 
Congress clearly discussed the need for online protection in the meetings leading up to 
enactment. See 141 CONG. REC. 15,502–05 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 22,044–46 (1995). 
 74. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 75. Id. § 230(f)(2). 
 76. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the broad 
definition of interactive computer services and citing cases that have applied the definition to 
grant immunity). 
 77. See id.; see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) (holding that a website is an interactive service provider because it provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a server). 
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By contrast, an information content provider is ―any person or entity that 
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the internet or any other interactive computer 
service.‖78  Courts have narrowly construed this definition to recognize 
users of websites that personally create and develop content as information 
content providers that can face liability.79  Though this distinction may 
seem insignificant at first blush, it has become intensely debated in the 
courts and has led to broad immunity for websites from both civil and 
criminal liability.80  Although interactive computer services are not 
immunized when explicitly developing informational content, judicial 
interpretations of § 230(c) found that interactive computer services do have 
some flexibility when making editorial changes before becoming exposed 
to liability as information content providers.81 
4.   Exceptions to the Communications Decency Act 
The CDA also contains a few important exceptions that greatly impact 
immunity and further these policy goals.82  Under § 230(e), Congress 
explained the effect that the CDA would have on other laws.83  For 
example, the CDA has no impact on ―any law pertaining to intellectual 
property‖ and will not ―be construed to limit the application of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.‖84  The provisions that 
are most critical to this Note dictate the effect of the CDA on criminal law 
and on state laws.85 
Under § 230(e)(1), Congress expressly directed that ―[n]othing in [§ 230] 
shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this 
title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual 
exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal criminal 
statute.‖86  This provision seems logical, given that one of the stated policy 
goals of the CDA is to vigorously enforce federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish computer crimes such as trafficking, obscenity, and stalking.87  
Under § 230(e)(3), the CDA cannot be construed ―to prevent any State from 
 
 78. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
 79. See Eric Weslander, Comment, Murky “Development”:  How the Ninth Circuit 
Exposed Ambiguity Within the Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers 
Should Worry, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 268 (2008) (―For years, courts have construed the 
terms ‗creation‘ and ‗development‘ narrowly.  As a result, websites have been allowed to 
solicit, encourage, edit, and aggressively promote information supplied by third parties 
without being potentially liable for its contents.‖). 
 80. See generally Larkin, supra note 62; see also infra Part III. 
 81. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER & HOLLY K. TOWLE, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS ¶ 10.09[3] (2009); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 
327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that under § 230(c)(1) websites must have some editorial 
discretion to decide whether to publish, edit, or withdraw content without facing liability). 
 82. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (entitled ―Effect on other laws‖). 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. § 230(e)(2), (4). 
 85. Id. § 230(e)(1), (3). 
 86. Id. § 230(e)(1). 
 87. Id. § 230(b)(5). 
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enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section,‖ but ―[n]o cause 
of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State 
or local law that is inconsistent with this section.‖88  Although this 
provision may seem clear, it has been challenging for courts to interpret 
because it does not define what type of state laws are consistent with the 
CDA.89 
Courts engage in a three-part inquiry to determine whether immunity 
exists under the CDA and consequently whether a state law claim is 
consistent with the CDA:  ―[i] whether Defendant is a provider of an 
interactive computer service; [ii] if the postings at issue are information 
provided by another information content provider; and [iii] whether 
Plaintiff's claims seek to treat Defendant as a publisher or speaker of third 
party content.‖90  If the answer to each question is ―yes,‖ immunity should 
be granted, and thus the state law cause of action is inconsistent with the 
CDA.91 
These provisions have given rise to controversy, as some plaintiffs have 
attempted to prosecute interactive computer services under state criminal 
laws.92  However, the plain text of § 230(e)(1) exempts ―[f]ederal criminal 
statutes‖ specifically and does not mention state laws and therefore 
eliminates any argument for state law exemption.93  Further, most courts 
have read § 230(e)(1) and (e)(3) together to find that Congress only 
intended to give interactive computer services immunity from state laws 
that are consistent with the CDA; any state criminal law that is inconsistent 
with the CDA is preempted.94  It is clear, however, that Congress did not 
 
 88. Id. § 230(e)(3). 
 89. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 702 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (―230(e)(3) provides no substantive content‖); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 
958 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (observing that 
the CDA ―contains no explicit expression of congressional intent with respect to the scope of 
preemption‖). 
 90. Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB), 2009 WL 1704355, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 
F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 2008)); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 91. See Gibson, 2009 WL 1704355, at *3–4. 
 92. See generally Doe v. Bates, No. 5 Civ. 00091 (DF), 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. 
Dec. 27, 2006) (unsuccessfully sued Yahoo for hosting child pornography on its 
―Candyman‖ group).  A number of civil cases have attempted to hold websites liable as a 
result of sex crimes against children. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 
2008) (negligence claim against MySpace after thirteen-year-old girl was sexually assaulted 
by an adult she met on MySpace); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) 
(negligence action against internet service provider for creating chat rooms where users 
market obscene photographs to minors).  The majority of cases involving CDA immunity are 
civil in nature and relate to claims of libel and defamation. See infra Part III.A–B.  However, 
these cases granting immunity for negligence and criminal claims show the unbridled reach 
of the CDA that poses a significant challenge to young victimized plaintiffs. 
 93. See Voicenet Commc‘ns, Inc. v. Corbett, No. 04 Civ. 01318, 2006 WL 2506318, at 
*4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006) (finding that ―if Congress had wanted state criminal statutes to 
trump the CDA as well, it knew how to say so‖). 
 94. See id. 
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intend, expressly or impliedly, to automatically preempt all state law causes 
of action pertaining to interactive computer services.95 
C.   The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption 
Preemption is ―the principle . . . that a federal law can supersede or 
supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation.‖96  This principle is 
derived from the Supremacy Clause, which states that the ―Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.‖97  Under the Supremacy 
Clause, federal law will override any conflicting state law in cases where 
both valid state and federal law could apply.98  Under the preemption 
doctrine, however, states completely lose the power to regulate an area of 
law regardless of any conflict with federal law due to Congress‘s express or 
implied intent to preempt state law.99 
A federal law expressly preempts state laws when Congress explicitly 
states an intention to preempt any state laws.100  Preemption can be implied 
in two ways:  field preemption and conflict preemption.101  Field 
preemption allows Congress to indicate the intent to occupy an entire field 
of regulation, thereby preempting states from enacting any laws in that 
area.102  Conflict preemption allows Congress to preempt any state law that 
directly conflicts with federal law.103  Conflict preemption typically occurs 
when an individual cannot possibly comply with both state and federal 
law.104  It also occurs where state law ―stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.‖105 
Each kind of preemption poses unique challenges for courts.106  Despite 
these differences, all questions of preemption begin with an examination of 
 
 95. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (―Congress did not intend to occupy the field of liability . . . to the 
exclusion of state law.  Section 230‘s language and legislative history [reflect] that 
Congress‘s purpose in enacting that section was not to preclude any state regulation of the 
internet, but rather to eliminate obstacles to the private development of blocking and filtering 
technologies capable of restricting inappropriate online content.‖). 
 96. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1368–69 (10th ed. 2009). 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 98. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771 
(1994) (discussing the distinction between supremacy and preemption, noting that 
supremacy does not strip power from the states). 
 99. See id. (observing that ―preemption is a significantly more radical inroad on state 
power than supremacy‖). 
 100. See Gade v. Nat‘l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass‘ns, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 106. See Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption:  An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1604, 1606 (2007). 
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congressional intent.107  In order to discern congressional intent, courts 
generally look to the structure and the text of the federal statute at issue.108  
Unfortunately, congressional intent is often difficult to determine,109 and 
thus ―multiple interpretations of the preemptive scope of a federal statute 
are almost always plausible.‖110  Courts are then confronted with the 
additional challenge of reconciling the many interpretations before coming 
to a decision.111 
The Supreme Court recognizes a presumption against federal preemption, 
where the Court ―start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers 
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‖112  This presumption helps 
courts determine whether Congress intended preemption and, if so, the 
scope of the statute‘s intended preemption.113 
Because the preemption question can only be answered by the specific 
statutory scheme at issue, there exists no uniform resolution for the courts 
and cases are often disparate.114  Therefore, interpretation of the scope of 
CDA preemption here is influenced by the specific cases that have 
previously addressed the statutory scheme, as discussed in Part III. 
II.   THE LAWS AND THE LITIGATION:  BACKPAGE.COM VERSUS THE STATES 
Recent state statutes, enacted by Washington, Tennessee, New Jersey, 
and Connecticut, criminalizing the knowing publication of minor sex 
trafficking advertisements online led to contentious litigation in district 
courts between Backpage.com and the states.  Part II of this Note examines 
the laws and the litigation involved in Backpage.com v. McKenna,115 
Backpage.com v. Cooper,116 and Backpage.com v. Hoffman117 and 
 
 107. See id. 
 108. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (discussing how courts should interpret whether a state 
regulation is preempted by a federal statute). 
 109. See Note, supra note 106, at 1606. (―In implied preemption cases, there are no 
statutory provisions explaining which state laws Congress intended to preempt, and even 
when Congress includes an express preemption clause in a statute, such clauses are often 
absurdly vague . . . .‖).  This is the challenge at the heart of this Note, as courts grapple with 
the difficult task of determining congressional intent to decide whether the CDA preempts a 
particular state law. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. at 1607. 
 112. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  The Court has offered rationales for this 
presumption which all center around promoting federalism. See Note, supra note 106, at 
1607.  Because of the serious issues raised by this presumption, scholarly debate over the 
justification and applicability of the presumption against preemption will continue. See id. at 
1626. 
 113. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. 
 114. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973) (―Our 
prior cases on pre-emption are not precise guidelines in the present controversy, for each 
case turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme in 
question.‖). 
 115. 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
 116. 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). 
 117. No. 13 Civ. 03952, 2013 WL 4502097 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013). 
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highlights the important conflict regarding CDA preemption that effectively 
decides these cases.  Part II.A discusses the state statutes at issue and the 
purposes behind their enactment.  Part II.B outlines the arguments 
presented by each party and explains the courts‘ decisions in McKenna, 
Cooper, and Hoffman. 
A.   States Outlaw Commercial Sex Advertisements Depicting Minors 
Washington was the first state to enact a law criminalizing ―advertising 
commercial sexual abuse of a minor.‖118  The statute effectively outlaws the 
knowing publication of commercial sex advertisements depicting 
children.119  It served as a model for the Tennessee and New Jersey statutes 
enacted thereafter.120  The statutory text is nearly identical, with only a few 
key distinctions.  However, the effect is the same in that the statutes 
criminalize the knowing publication or dissemination of minor sex 
trafficking advertisements online or in print.121 
 
 118. The relevant provisions of the Washington statute as enacted in 2012 are as follows: 
A person commits the offense of advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor 
if he or she knowingly publishes, disseminates, or displays, or causes directly or 
indirectly, to be published, disseminated, or displayed, any advertisement for a 
commercial sex act, which is to take place in the state of Washington and that 
includes the depiction of a minor. . . . 
In a prosecution under this statute it is not a defense that the defendant did not 
know the age of the minor depicted in the advertisement. It is a defense, which the 
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant made 
a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor depicted in the 
advertisement by requiring, prior to publication, dissemination, or display of the 
advertisement, production of a driver‘s license, marriage license, birth certificate, 
or other governmental or educational identification card or paper of the minor 
depicted in the advertisement and did not rely solely on oral or written 
representations of the minor‘s age, or the apparent age of the minor as depicted. In 
order to invoke the defense, the defendant must produce for inspection by law 
enforcement a record of the identification used to verify the age of the person 
depicted in the advertisement. 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104 (West 2012) (repealed 2013); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:13-10 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315 (West 2012).  The New Jersey 
statutory text is almost identical to the Washington text, although it presents more findings 
and guidance behind the legislature‘s policy choices in the statutory text. See N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:13-10. 
 119. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104. 
 120. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315. 
 121. The Washington and New Jersey statutes are almost identical in text and effect in 
that they criminalize the knowing publication, dissemination, or display, as well as the direct 
or indirect causation, of advertisements of commercial sex acts depicting minors. See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104.  Thus, the law applies to both 
traffickers and hosts, and websites like Backpage.com could face criminal liability if they 
knowingly published or displayed such advertisements.  The Tennessee statute is phrased 
differently, but was also attacked because it criminalizes the knowing sale or offer for sale of 
an advertisement featuring a criminal sex act with a minor, and therefore has the same 
practical effect as the Washington and New Jersey statutes. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
315.  The Connecticut statute enacted in 2012 has withstood scrutiny because it only applies 
to users of these websites, not the websites themselves.  A person must ―knowingly 
[purchase] advertising space for an advertisement for a commercial sex act that includes a 
depiction of a minor‖ to have committed the crime. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196i 
(West 2012).  Therefore, the Connecticut statute has not faced judicial scrutiny and may be a 
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Further, these statutes each contain a prohibited defense and an 
affirmative defense.122  First, the laws expressly state that it is not a defense 
that the defendant did not know the age of the minor depicted in the 
advertisement.123  Second, the laws state that it is a defense that a defendant 
made a reasonable, good faith effort to ascertain the true age of the minor 
depicted in the advertisement prior to publication.124  But, this defense 
poses a hurdle for most defendants as it requires that, prior to publication, 
the defendant requested ―production of a driver‘s license, marriage license, 
birth certificate, or other governmental or educational identification card or 
paper of the minor depicted and did not rely solely on oral or written 
representations of the minor‘s age, or the apparent age of the minor as 
depicted.‖125  This poses a challenge to Backpage.com and other websites 
that screen for depicted minors based on the apparent age of the minor and 
require no other proof of age.126 
The states enacted these statutes in an effort to combat sex trafficking 
online.  The New Jersey legislature outlined its findings in the statutory 
text, noting that ―[a]dvertisements for selling the services of girls as escorts 
on Internet websites falsely claim that these girls are 18 years of age or 
older, when the girls actually are minors.‖127  After acknowledging the 
Washington and Connecticut laws previously enacted to combat sex 
trafficking online, the New Jersey legislature concluded that ―[s]ex 
trafficking of minors should be eliminated in conformity with federal laws 
prohibiting the sexual exploitation of children‖ and criminalized advertising 
commercial sexual abuse of a minor.128  These laws reflect the legislatures‘ 
recognition that ―the sale of children for commercial sexual abuse either 
online or in print is unacceptable,‖ and legislative action is needed to help 
society‘s most vulnerable citizens.129  However, the legislative targeting of 
minor sex trafficking advertising online poses unique issues in light of the 
CDA‘s immunity provision. 
B.   Backpage.com versus the States:  The Preemption Question 
Part II.B discusses the first issue presented in the litigation and the crux 
of this Note—whether the state legislation that criminalizes the publication 
 
viable alternative for state legislatures should they choose to abandon their crusade against 
the websites that host these advertisements. See Dalton, supra note 14, at 1115 n.82. 
 122. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315(c); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104(2). 
 123. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315(c); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104(2). 
 124. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315(c); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104(2). 
 125. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104(2); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(g); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315(c). 
 126. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
 127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(a)(3). 
 128. Id. § 2C:13-10(a)(8). 
 129. Delvin Bill to Combat Online Child Escort Ads Passes House, WASHINGTON STATE 
SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS (Feb. 28, 2012), http://src.wastateleg.org/delvin-bill-to-
combat-online-child-escort-ads-passes-house. 
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of minor sex trafficking advertisements is preempted by the CDA.  
Part II.B.1 explains the arguments for CDA preemption, and Part II.B.2 
outlines the arguments against preemption.  Part II.B.3 discusses the district 
courts‘ ultimate decision in finding that the CDA likely preempts the state 
legislation at issue.130 
1.   Backpage.com:  Arguments for Preemption 
In its McKenna, Cooper, and Hoffman briefs, plaintiff Backpage.com131 
argued for a broad interpretation of CDA immunity as applied by the 
majority of circuit courts.132  Backpage.com cited the many cases that have 
granted websites immunity from civil liability, noting that ―this broad 
immunity avoids the ‗obvious chilling effect‘ on free speech‖ Congress 
sought to prevent.‖133 
Backpage.com argued that § 230(e)(3) grants interactive computer 
services immunity ―under any state law of whatever kind, including 
criminal laws,‖ noting that there are exceptions for federal criminal laws but 
not for similar state laws.134  Backpage.com argued that if Congress 
intended to exempt state criminal laws as well, it would have expressly 
included the language in § 230(e)(3).135  As a result, Backpage.com 
concluded that the criminal statutes at issue are inconsistent with § 230 
 
 130. The district courts in these cases were tasked with deciding whether a preliminary 
injunction should be granted.  As a result, the arguments for preemption, First Amendment, 
and the Commerce Clause, were all addressed under the umbrella question of whether the 
plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits; this is one of the prongs of the test for 
preliminary injunctions. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see 
also Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2012).  
Thus, the court only goes so far as to decide whether the statutes would likely be preempted 
or violate the Constitution. See McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. 
 131. Although the Internet Archive is also a plaintiff in these cases, its position is not the 
focus of the litigation or within the scope of this Note. 
 132. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 8–12; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s 
Brief, supra note 9, at 17–22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 9–13.  This Note will 
discuss the arguments Backpage.com presented in the McKenna, Cooper, and Hoffman 
litigation collectively due to the extensive similarities among the briefs submitted.  In all 
three cases, plaintiff Backpage.com filed nearly identical briefs in support of its motions that 
presented the same key arguments relating to CDA preemption. See Hoffman Plaintiff‘s 
Brief, supra note 9, at 17–22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 9–13; McKenna 
Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 8–12.  The Hoffman brief may be the only outlier, as it 
engaged in an even more thorough analysis of the key arguments supporting CDA immunity.  
Further, the Hoffman brief used the decisions from McKenna and Cooper to strengthen the 
argument for preemption. See Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 17–22. 
 133. McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 9; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief, 
supra note 9, at 20; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 10; see also infra Part III.A. 
 134. McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 10; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief, 
supra note 9, at 20; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 11. 
 135. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 8, Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 
1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (No. 12-00954) [hereinafter McKenna Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief]; see 
also Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 
(M.D. Tenn. 2013) (No. 12-00654) [hereinafter Cooper Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief]. 
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because they treat Backpage.com as a publisher of third-party content and 
thus are preempted by the CDA.136 
When discussing Congress‘s intent in passing the CDA, Backpage.com 
argued that Congress intended to encourage interactive computer services to 
restrict access to objectionable online material through voluntary 
participation in self-policing.137  Backpage.com therefore found the 
problems with this state legislation two-fold.  On the one hand, these 
statutes ―in one sense [made] review and monitoring mandatory, given the 
risk of state criminal liability.‖138  Conversely, Backpage.com noted that 
the statutes‘ ―knowing‖ mens rea requirement may actually dissuade 
websites from reviewing third-party content to avoid criminal liability, thus 
contradicting § 230 and Congress‘s intent.139 
Lastly, Backpage.com echoed important public policy concerns raised in 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc.140 and other cases finding CDA immunity.141  
Backpage.com highlighted the differences between internet and brick-and-
mortar stores, including the global nature of online business and the 
challenges of requiring identification before third-party posting.142  
Backpage.com contended that verifying identification before posting will 
dissuade individuals from posting content because of privacy burdens.143  
Thus, Backpage.com argued, these statutes ―would severely restrict speech 
on the Internet, exactly what Congress sought to avoid.‖144 
Legal scholar Eric Goldman speaks out frequently in support of the CDA 
and its immunity provision.145  Shortly after the district court‘s decision in 
McKenna, Goldman penned an article in support of Backpage.com and the 
decision.146  Goldman argued that the Washington statute could undermine 
§ 230‘s immunity by making websites undertake costly verification and 
 
 136. McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 11; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief, 
supra note 9, at 22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 13. 
 137. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 9; see also Cooper 
Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 14. 
 138. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 9; see also Cooper 
Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 14. 
 139. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 9; see also Cooper 
Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 14. 
 140. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 141. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 11–12; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s 
Brief, supra note 9, at 21–22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12. 
 142. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 11–12; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s 
Brief, supra note 9, at 21–22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12. 
 143. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s 
Brief, supra note 9, at 22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12. 
 144. McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12. 
 145. On Forbes.com and in his Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Eric Goldman has 
posted many articles concerning § 230 and its immunity provision. See Eric Goldman, Why 
The State Attorneys General’s Assault On Internet Immunity Is A Terrible Idea, FORBES 
(June 27, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/06/27/why-the-
state-attorneys-generals-assault-on-internet-immunity-is-a-terrible-idea; infra notes 146–49 
and accompanying text. 
 146. See Eric Goldman, Backpage Gets Important 47 USC 230 Win Against Washington 
Law Trying to Combat Online Prostitution Ads, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 31, 2012), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/07/backpage_gets_i.htm. 
2014] FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE TO WIN THE WAR 395 
record-keeping efforts.147  As a result, operation of user-generated content 
websites would be cost prohibitive, especially for small businesses and new 
entrants to the market.148  In a blog post after Cooper, Goldman noted that 
the courts‘ interpretation of § 230 is favorable because ―it focuses on 
statutory effect, not just the statute‘s literal words‖ and noted that other 
courts should follow Cooper‘s approach so that states cannot ―come up with 
other tricky legislative workarounds to Section 230.‖149  Kevin Bankston, 
an attorney for the Center for Democracy & Technology, also spoke out 
supporting CDA immunity in the Backpage.com litigation.150  Bankston 
noted that liability for third-party content, as imposed by these state 
statutes, ―would be devastating to the free expression environment 
online.‖151  Bankston and Goldman both echoed the policy arguments made 
by Backpage.com in its briefs in support of CDA immunity. 
2.   States:  Arguments Against Preemption 
In response to Backpage.com‘s motion for a preliminary injunction in 
each case, the state attorney general filed an opposition brief arguing that 
the CDA did not preempt the legislation in question.152 
The states addressed the merits of Backpage.com‘s facial attack on the 
statutes in question.153  The states argued that, to succeed in a facial 
challenge, Backpage.com must show that the statute would not be valid 
under any circumstances.154  Because the statutes also apply to other forms 
of media and traffickers themselves, the states argued that Backpage.com 
failed to meet this burden and thus the statute survives CDA preemption.155 
Further, the states argued that the statutes in question are consistent with 
the CDA based on the CDA‘s stated purpose of protecting minors from 
obscenity on the internet and thus are not preempted under § 230(e)(3).156  
 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Eric Goldman, Some 47 USC 230 Cases From the Past Year You Might Have Missed 
(Because I Didn’t Blog Them), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 5, 2013), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/07/some_47_usc_230.htm. 
 150. See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s How an Anti-Prostitution Campaign Could Threaten 
Free Speech Online, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/09/heres-how-an-anti-prostitution-campaign-could-threaten-
free-speech-online/. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 10–18; see also Cooper 
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–17; McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 
8–17. 
 153. See McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 11–12; see also Cooper 
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–14. 
 154. See McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 11–12; see also Cooper 
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–14. 
 155. See McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 11–12; see also Cooper 
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–14. 
 156. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 14–17; see also Cooper 
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 16–17; McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 
12–17.  The state in McKenna engages in an examination of the word ―consistent‖ and its 
ordinary meaning—―in agreement with, compatible, or conforming to the same principles or 
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The states viewed § 230(e)(3) as an explicit statement of congressional 
intent to grant interactive computer services immunity under state or local 
proceedings but not as automatic preemption.157  Rather, the states argued 
that the CDA only preempts state laws that are inconsistent with the 
CDA.158  Thus, the states contended that the ―criminal statute can exist in 
tandem with [the CDA], and the two statutes do not conflict.‖159  Because 
the statutes at issue regulate conduct, not speech, and thus do not treat 
Backpage.com as a publisher or speaker of information, they are not 
preempted by the CDA.160 
Lastly, the states argued that the statutes are consistent with the purposes 
behind § 230 and federal criminal laws, which are exempt from CDA 
immunity, and thus consistent with the CDA.161  Therefore, the states 
conclude that the statutes in question are not preempted by the CDA.162 
3.   The District Court Decisions 
In McKenna, Cooper, and Hoffman, the courts all ruled in favor of 
Backpage.com under a broad interpretation of CDA immunity.163  Because 
plaintiff Backpage.com sought a preliminary injunction of the statutes, it 
 
course of action‖—to conclude that the statute is in fact consistent with the CDA. McKenna 
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 14.  This, the state claims, is supported by the legislative 
history of the CDA. Id. at 15–16. 
 157. See McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 8, 10; see also Hoffman 
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 13–17; Cooper Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 16–
17.  This theory is based entirely on the plain text of the statute.  Section 230(e)(3) states:  
―No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local 
law that is inconsistent with this section.‖ 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2012).  However, it does 
not say that no law may be enacted to impose liability for third-party content; rather, states 
can enact legislation but its application may be preempted depending on the specific facts of 
a case. 
 158. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 11 (―Under this express 
pronouncement, the Act is not preempted by the CDA unless it is inconsistent with the 
CDA.‖). 
 159. Id. at 10. 
 160. The statutes each differ in their application to an interactive service provider.  The 
Tennessee statute criminalizes the selling or offering to sell of advertisements, not the 
posting.  As a result, the state argues that the statutes impose liability regardless of 
dissemination, so long as a sale was made.  Therefore, the statute does not treat an 
interactive service provider as a publisher.  In contrast, the Washington and New Jersey 
statutes criminalize the knowing publication of advertisements. See supra note 121. 
 161. McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–17. 
 162. The states contend that Congress‘s focus in enacting the CDA was to provide 
interactive computer services with immunity from civil liability.  In the Hoffman brief, the 
state goes so far as to argue that Congress did not intend to apply CDA immunity to criminal 
prosecutions at all, though this is disputed by the plaintiffs and other court interpretations of 
the CDA. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 13–14.  The state noted that the 
CDA ―was not meant to create a lawless no-man‘s-land on the Internet.‖ Hoffman 
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 17 (quoting Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 163. See Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 13 Civ. 03952, 2013 WL 4502097 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 20, 2013); Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); 
Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012).  The court 
opinions are very similar in both reasoning and text and are identical in outcome:  all three 
judges granted preliminary injunctions in favor of Backpage.com. 
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―must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance 
of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public 
interest.‖164  With this framework in mind, the courts examined whether the 
plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits in part by determining the 
likelihood of CDA preemption. 
In making this decision, the courts first looked to the relevant provisions:  
§ 230(c) and § 230(e)(3).165  The courts analyzed Congress‘s purpose in 
enacting the statute, noting that Congress purposely decided not to treat 
interactive computer services like newspapers, magazines, or television 
stations, which may face liability based on third-party content.166  There are 
two primary reasons behind this decision:  to encourage free speech and 
development of the internet and to encourage computer services to self-
police the internet for obscenity.167 
After highlighting the standards for preemption, the courts found that the 
statutes here are likely expressly preempted by the CDA and likely conflict 
with federal law.168  After analyzing the consistency between the statutes in 
question and the CDA, the courts ultimately held that these criminal statutes 
would treat interactive computer services as publishers and would 
contradict the stated purposes of Congress by discouraging self-policing 
online.169  Therefore, the courts decided that § 230 likely preempts the 
statutes.170 
 
 164. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also McKenna, 
881 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. 
 165. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *5–6; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 822–23; 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. 
 166. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *5; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 824–25; 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. 
 167. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *5; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 824–25; 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. 
 168. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *5; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 823–26; 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273. 
 169. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097 at *5–7; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 824; 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273. 
 170. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *6; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 828; McKenna, 
881 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.  Backpage.com raised two additional claims in this litigation:  
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and violation of the Commerce Clause. 
See Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 22–23, 35; see also Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, 
supra note 9, at 13–14, 22; McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12–13, 22.  
Backpage.com argues that this new legislation violates the First Amendment by ―requir[ing] 
online service providers to become the government‘s censors of the Internet,‖ consequently 
blocking protected speech, dispensing with scienter, and failing strict scrutiny. See Hoffman 
Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 13; see also Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12; 
McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12.  In response, the states argued that the 
legislation does include a scienter requirement and does not violate the First Amendment 
because it regulates unprotected illegal speech and thus is content neutral, surviving both 
intermediate and strict scrutiny. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 20–38; see 
also Cooper Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 17–23; McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra 
note 10, at 17–20.  Backpage.com also argues that the new legislation violates the 
Commerce Clause by regulating commerce outside state borders because the internet does 
not recognize geographic borders. See Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 35–38; see 
also Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 22–24; McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 
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C.   The Current Landscape 
In each case, the district courts ruled in favor of Backpage.com and 
granted a preliminary injunction that effectively prevented enforcement of 
the new legislation.171  The Washington legislature went so far as to repeal 
the enjoined statute.172  A district court in the Middle District of Tennessee 
issued a decision granting a permanent injunction,173 and a district court in 
the District of New Jersey issued a decision granting a preliminary 
injunction, which was appealed to the Third Circuit but ultimately 
dismissed in June 2014.174  Preemption was one of the key issues in the 
appeal.175  In August 2014, Backpage.com moved for summary judgment in 
the District Court of New Jersey, seeking to convert the preliminary 
injunction into a permanent injunction.176  The defendants submitted a letter 
advising the court that the state does not oppose Backpage.com‘s summary 
judgment motion.177 
A year prior, in July 2013, the attorneys general of forty-nine states wrote 
to Congress requesting that the CDA be amended to expressly state that it 
does not preempt state criminal statutes.178  In response, the American Civil 
 
9, at 22–23.  The states contend that there is no Commerce Clause violation because the laws 
―further a legitimate local public interest without imposing an excessive burden on interstate 
commerce.‖ Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 38–42; see also Cooper 
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 30–35; McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 
33–36.  Although the courts here could have simply stopped at preemption, as preemption 
bars the litigation before even answering the constitutional questions, they decided 
otherwise.  The courts disagreed with the states, finding that Backpage.com would likely 
succeed on the merits of both the First Amendment and Commerce Clause claims. See 
Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097 at *7–10, *12; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 828–45; McKenna, 
881 F. Supp. 2d at 1275, 1286.  Thus, the courts ruled in favor of Backpage.com and granted 
the preliminary injunction. 
 171. See generally Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 805; 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. 
 172. S. 5488, 63rd. Leg. (Wash. 2013), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/ 
billdocs/2013-14/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/5488%20SBR%20FBR%2013.pdf (repealing 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104 (West 2012)). 
 173. See David Gialanella, Law Banning Underage Escort Ads Enjoined as 
Constitutionally Flawed, N.J. L.J. (Aug. 9, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://www.law.com/jsp/nj/ 
PubArticleFriendlyNJ.jsp?id=1202614767613. 
 174. See id.; see also Dismissal Order, Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 13-3850 (3d 
Cir. June 10, 2014). 
 175. Concise Summary of the Case at 2, Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 13-3850 
(3d Cir. Oct. 8, 2013).  The appeal raised two other issues:  ―Whether N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:13-10b(1) comports with the First and Fourteenth Amendments [and] [w]hether N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:13-10b(1) runs afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.‖ Id. 
 176. Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–2, Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 2-
03952 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013), 2013 WL 4502097. 
 177. Letter from Defendants to Hon. Claire Cecchi, Hoffman, No. 2-03952. 
 178. See Att‘ys Gen. Letter, supra note 8.  The attorneys general first noted that sex 
traffickers use online classifieds as a vehicle for sex trades in many cases. See id.  As a 
result, websites such as Backpage.com.com have built their businesses around this income 
from ―adult‖ advertisements. See id.  After highlighting the purposes of the CDA and stories 
of recent online trafficking victims, the attorneys general requested that Congress amend the 
CDA to read (amended language italicized):  ―Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) 
or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal or State 
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Liberties Union (ACLU) and other interested groups submitted a letter to 
Congress in support of the CDA in its current form, raising similar 
arguments to those made by Backpage.com.179  Eric Goldman boldly wrote 
that ―amending Section 230 to address online prostitution would be a 
spectacularly bad idea.‖180 
III.   VARYING INTERPRETATIONS OF CDA IMMUNITY AND THE STATES‘ 
OPTIONS IN THE FACE OF PREEMPTION 
The dispute concerning whether these state criminal laws are preempted 
by the CDA highlights important concerns with respect to CDA immunity 
and interpretation.  Part III of this Note examines the growing conflict 
regarding interpretation of the CDA‘s immunity provision that has 
developed among the courts over the past decade.  Part III.A analyzes how 
courts have interpreted immunity under the CDA differently, which 
effectively decides the preemption question.  Part III.B explores the 
litigation and legislation options states have to combat minor sex trafficking 
when confronting CDA preemption. 
A.   Conflicting Interpretations of CDA Immunity 
Since the enactment of the CDA, courts have disagreed over the 
interpretation of the immunity granted to interactive computer services.  
Although the majority of courts have interpreted CDA immunity broadly, 
some courts and legal scholars are beginning to argue for a narrower 
interpretation in light of the growth and changes of the internet since the 
enactment of the CDA.  Part III.A.1 assesses the broad interpretation of 
CDA immunity implemented by the majority of courts.  Part III.A.2 
examines the narrower interpretation applies in a number of recent cases.   
1.   Broad Interpretation of ―Interactive Computer Service‖ and Immunity 
Under the CDA 
The Fourth Circuit‘s decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.181 has 
become the foundation of the extensive jurisprudence applying a broad 
 
criminal statute.‖ Id. (emphasis in original). This, according to the letter, will restore to state 
authorities the ―traditional jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those who promote 
prostitution and endanger our children.‖ Id. 
 179. See Letter to Congress (July 30, 2013), available at https://www.cdt.org/ 
files/pdfs/coalition-230-letter-congress.pdf.  This letter was undersigned by a number of 
advocacy organizations, associations, investors, and legal scholars who opposed the 
suggestion of the Attorneys General to amend the CDA. See id.  The letter concluded that 
amending the CDA would ―jeopardize the continued growth of the entire Internet industry 
and the free expression rights of Internet users everywhere‖ by disincentivizing websites 
from hosting third-party content. Id.  In the letter, the undersigned stressed the importance of 
the need to work together to find a solution to the problem of sex trafficking while 
preserving free speech and innovation online but noted that the amendment suggested 
―should not be the starting point for . . . a productive dialogue between Congress, the State 
AGs, and the Internet community.‖ Id. 
 180. Goldman, supra note 146. 
 181. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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interpretation of CDA immunity.182  The decision, rendered shortly after the 
statute‘s enactment in 1996, was one of the first cases to interpret the CDA 
and has been cited by the majority of circuit courts that grant CDA 
immunity to websites and other interactive computer services.183 
In Zeran, plaintiff Kenneth Zeran brought a civil action against AOL, 
arguing that AOL had acted negligently when ―unreasonably delay[ing] 
removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third party, 
refus[ing] to post retractions of those messages, and fail[ing] to screen for 
similar postings thereafter.‖184  AOL argued that the newly enacted CDA 
immunized AOL as an interactive computer service from civil liability for 
third-party content.185  The district court ruled in favor of AOL, and Zeran 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit.186 
The court first established that AOL is in fact an interactive computer 
service under the CDA, as it allows subscribers to access information stored 
on its network.187  The court then addressed the immunity provision under 
§ 230(c), finding that ―lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for 
its exercise of a publisher‘s traditional editorial functions . . . are barred.‖188  
Congress, the court found, recognized that the threat of tort-based liability 
would likely chill free speech on the ―new and burgeoning Internet 
medium‖ as interactive computer services would likely choose to restrict 
posted messages.189  Although scanning each post to determine if it 
contains defamatory information may be feasible for a traditional print 
publisher, the court found that ―the sheer number of postings on interactive 
computer services would create an impossible burden in the Internet 
context.‖190 
Therefore, by immunizing interactive computer services from liability, 
Congress could still enforce federal criminal laws against the original 
culpable party while ―encourag[ing] service providers to self-regulate the 
dissemination of offensive material over their services.‖191  Noting that 
Congress enacted the ―broad immunity‖ of § 230 with these purposes in 
mind, the court found that Zeran‘s negligence claim incorrectly treated 
AOL as a traditional publisher, and thus the court immunized AOL from 
liability.192 
 
 182. See Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers:  How 
Zeran v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 
585 (2008). 
 183. See Mark D. Quist, “Plumbing the Depths” of the CDA:  Weighing the Competing 
Fourth and Seventh Circuit Standards of ISP Immunity Under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 275, 286 (2012) (observing that 
Zeran ―remains the most commonly cited case in statutory analyses of Section 230‖). 
 184. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Id. at 328–29. 
 188. Id. at 330. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 333. 
 191. Id. at 331. 
 192. Id. 
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Other circuits have repeatedly applied Zeran‘s broad interpretation of 
CDA immunity from civil liability, referencing Zeran‘s reasoning and 
interpretation in granting CDA immunity.193  The analysis in these cases is 
substantially similar.  First, courts restate the relevant provisions of § 230 
that call for immunity of interactive computer services.194  The courts then 
address Congress‘s dual purpose in enacting the CDA:  ―to encourage the 
unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and 
to promote the development of e-commerce.‖195  Courts then engage in an 
analysis of these purposes and the dangers posed to free speech on the 
internet without immunity, citing to Zeran and other subsequent cases.196  
Finally, the courts grant immunity to the website at issue.197 
In addition to expansively interpreting the CDA‘s immunity provision, 
these cases have broadly interpreted the definition of an interactive 
computer service while rejecting any argument that would label the same 
interactive computer service an information content provider.198  In effect, 
this has led to an even broader grant of immunity under the CDA, as 
websites are immune even if engaging in activities that could be considered 
the ―creation or development of information.‖199  Supporters of this 
expansive immunity reason that the CDA ensures free speech online, while 
fostering the growth and development of the internet, and oppose attempts 
at CDA reform that would threaten these First Amendment protections.200 
Some courts and legal scholars have acknowledged the challenges posed 
by this immunity.  In Blumenthal v. Drudge,201 the court noted that ―[i]f it 
were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with plaintiffs.‖202  
However, the court acknowledged that Congress made a different policy 
 
 193. See, e.g., Universal Commc‘n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419–420 (1st 
Cir. 2007); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006); Carafano 
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 
1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003); Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 194. See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 418–19; Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1320–22; Carafano, 339 
F.3d at 1123–24; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026–29; Green, 318 F.3d at 470–71; Ben Ezra, 206 
F.3d at 985; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 195. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027. 
 196. See, e.g., Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1323; Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122–23; Batzel, 333 
F.3d at 1028; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985 n.3; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 197. See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422; Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1324; Carafano, 339 F.3d at 
1125; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1035; Green, 318 F.3d at 473; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 980, 987–
988; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 335. 
 198. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (―In light of these concerns, reviewing courts have 
treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition of 
‗interactive computer service‘ and a relatively restrictive definition of ‗information content 
provider‘.‖). 
 199. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012). 
 200. See Quist, supra note 183, at 308–09 (noting that if Congress wishes to resolve the 
CDA conflict, it must do so without undermining the internet‘s development); see also 
William H. Freivogel, Does the Communications Decency Act Foster Indecency?, 16 COMM. 
L. & POL‘Y 17, 44 (2011) (―Even some of the most moderate of the reforms . . . could raise 
First Amendment problems.‖). 
 201. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 202. Id. at 51. 
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choice and ―has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to 
Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other 
offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even 
attempted.‖203  This statement expresses the inherent challenge that has led 
some courts to narrow their interpretation of CDA immunity.  Moreover, 
with the increasing prevalence of cyberbullying, defamatory posts on social 
media, and online sex trafficking, many legal scholars and government 
officials have noted that the CDA‘s vague language has resulted in overly 
broad immunity for proper internet regulation.204  Section 230(e) also acts 
as an obstacle for state legislatures attempting to combat these issues by 
establishing new criminal laws that are often preempted by the CDA.205  As 
a result, some courts and scholars have become skeptical of the broad 
immunity conferred by § 230, and a growing minority of cases have 
narrowed the interpretation of the CDA. 
2.   Narrowing Interpretation of ―Interactive Computer Service‖ and 
Immunity Under the CDA 
In a number of recent cases, courts have conducted a more searching 
review of the acts of interactive computer services and have narrowed the 
interpretation of CDA immunity to impose liability on websites for third-
party content.  First, in two Seventh Circuit cases, Judge Easterbrook 
expressed his views in dicta that a narrower interpretation may be more 
appropriate, and other judges have agreed.206  Next, the Ninth Circuit in 
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com207 denied 
CDA immunity and imposed liability on the interactive computer service 
Roommates.com.208  Finally, the Tenth Circuit, following the lead of the 
Ninth Circuit in Roommates.com, also denied CDA immunity to an 
interactive computer service in FTC v. Accusearch.209 
Although the facts of these minority cases are markedly different than the 
ones discussed in Part III.A.1, the reasoning behind the decisions is crucial 
 
 203. Id. at 52. 
 204. See Freivogel, supra note 200, at 19 (―One impetus for limiting Section 230 
immunity comes from instances of anonymous Internet abuse that have grabbed headlines 
and largely escaped legal consequences . . . abuses include cyberbullying of teens, the 
humiliation of female college students, racially discriminatory housing postings, ubiquitous 
pornography.‖). 
 205. See id.; see also supra Part II. 
 206. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers‘ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 207. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 208. See id. 
 209. See FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).  The Eastern District of 
Kentucky in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 836 (E.D. 
Ky. 2011), also applied the Roommates.com holding to find interactive computer service 
liability, illustrating the shift from the typical broad immunity conferred to websites 
occurring in a minority of courts.  The court denied CDA immunity to Dirty World LLC, 
noting that ―[t]he immunity afforded by the CDA is not absolute and may be forfeited if the 
site owner invites the posting of illegal materials or makes actionable postings itself,‖ as 
Dirty World did here by posting defamatory statements written by an employee as part of the 
website‘s businesses. Id. 
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to understanding this change in interpretation.  In Doe v. GTE Corp.210 and 
Chicago Lawyers’ Community for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist,211 
the Seventh Circuit addressed the need for narrower interpretation of the 
CDA.212  Judge Easterbrook penned these two opinions, urging judges to 
interpret the CDA in the context of its title, ―Protection for ‗Good 
Samaritan‘ blocking and screening of offensive material.‖213  Under the 
current broad interpretation, Judge Easterbrook noted that interactive 
computer services are encouraged to do nothing about the distribution of 
indecent and offensive materials and still enjoy immunity under § 230(c), 
which is exactly contrary to the intentions of Congress as outlined in 
§ 230(b).214  However, Judge Easterbrook also acknowledged that the CDA 
does not provide ―a grant of comprehensive immunity from civil liability 
for content provided by a third party.‖215 
Although the decisions in both Doe and Chicago Lawyers’ Community 
granted CDA immunity, Judge Easterbrook addressed important concerns 
about the broad, majority interpretation of immunity.216  He noted in dicta 
that ―causing a particular statement to be made, or perhaps [causing] the 
discriminatory content of a statement‖ to be made by a third party may be 
sufficient to deny CDA immunity and hold an interactive computer service 
liable for that content.217  This is the same reasoning that is used by a 
minority of courts in denying CDA immunity to interactive computer 
services. 
Only five years later, the Ninth Circuit issued a striking opinion in 
Roommates.com that utilized a narrow interpretation of CDA immunity to 
find that Roommates.com acted as an information content provider.218  
Roommates.com ―elicit[ed] the allegedly illegal content and [made] 
aggressive use of it in conducting its business‖ by requiring users to answer 
discriminatory questions before creating housing profiles and thus acted as 
an information content provider for the purposes of § 230.219 
Judge Kozinski pointed out an important distinction in the congressional 
intent of the CDA overlooked by many other circuits.220  In enacting the 
CDA, ―Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated 
content, not the creation of content.‖221  If an interactive computer service 
posts original content or is responsible for the creation or development of 
 
 210. 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 211. 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 212. Id. at 666; see also GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 655. 
 213. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012); see also GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660. 
 214. See GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660 (―Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs‘ 
liability to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims of 
tortious or criminal conduct?‖). 
 215. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 670. 
 216. See Quist, supra note 183, at 296. 
 217. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671. 
 218. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 219. Id. at 1172. 
 220. See id. at 1163. 
 221. Id. 
404 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
such content, it may also be an information content provider.222  When an 
interactive computer service acts as an information content provider, 
Congress did not intend for CDA immunity to apply.223  It is based on this 
reasoning that the Ninth Circuit denied Roommates.com immunity. 
The court noted an important policy concern that justifies a narrow 
interpretation of CDA immunity and preemption: 
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that 
could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of 
laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses.  Rather, it 
has become a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which 
commerce is conducted.  And its vast reach into the lives of millions is 
exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity 
provided by Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair advantage 
over their real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of 
general applicability.224 
The court recognized the changes in the internet and its maturity over the 
last decade and reasoned that this is a strong indication that a narrower 
interpretation of CDA immunity is more appropriate.225  ―[S]uch a broad 
reading[,]‖ as in cases such as Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,226 
―would sap section 230 of all meaning.‖227  Thus, the Ninth Circuit created 
a new rule that has been applied by a minority of circuits over the past five 
years:  ―a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within 
the exception to [§ 230 immunity], if it contributes materially to the alleged 
illegality of the conduct.‖228 
In FTC v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit looked at the meaning of the 
words ―development‖ and ―responsible‖ in the definition of information 
content provider to determine whether, as in Roommates.com, the website 
operator should be denied CDA immunity.229  The Court construed the term 
―development‖ broadly, and held that an interactive computer service is 
responsible for the development of offensive content only if it in some way 
 
 222. See id. at 1162–63. 
 223. See id. (―When Congress passed section 230 it didn‘t intend to prevent the 
enforcement of all laws online; rather, it sought to encourage interactive computer services 
that provide users neutral tools to post content online to police that content without fear that 
through their ‗good samaritan . . . screening of offensive material,‘ . . . they would become 
liable for every single message posted by third parties on their website.‖). 
 224. Id. at 1164–65 n.15. 
 225. See id. 
 226. 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 227. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172.  The court engaged in an extensive 
discussion of why its holding does not contradict other Ninth Circuit precedent such as 
Carafano v. Metrosplash. See id. at 1171–76.  The court concluded that the case at bar is 
quite different than Carafano in that Roommates.com explicitly elicited the discriminatory 
information from users. See id. 
 228. Id. at 1168.  Judge Kozinski opined:  ―The message to website operators [after this 
case] is clear:  If you don‘t encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users 
to input illegal content, you will be immune.‖ See id. at 1175. 
 229. FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197–200 (10th Cir. 2009). 
2014] FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE TO WIN THE WAR 405 
specifically encourages the development of the offensive content; thus, 
Accusearch was liable as an information content provider.230 
The primary argument against narrower immunity is the threat to free 
speech and innovation on the internet.231  However, there is still support for 
narrower immunity both within these opinions and in the legal world.232  
For example, in a Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy article, Gregory 
Dickinson argued against broad immunity when stating that the internet 
―and its extremely broad immunity seems slightly out of step with modern 
policy objectives.‖233  He reasoned that as a ―robust and integral part of 
modern life[,]‖ the internet can now be safely subjected to some 
regulation.234  Thus, a narrower interpretation of CDA immunity would be 
more appropriate to regulate conduct online.235  Further, the notion that 
holding websites liable for third-party content or requiring review of online 
posts would be too burdensome is losing traction as many websites, 
including Backpage.com, have started to actively screen material before 
publication with little imposition.236 
Although these arguments for limited immunity are logically consistent 
with the purposes of the CDA,237 narrower CDA immunity is still the 
minority viewpoint among the courts.  Therefore, when confronted with 
CDA immunity, those looking to impose civil or criminal liability on 
interactive computer services such as Backpage.com must tackle a 
challenging obstacle and consider new solutions to an enduring problem. 
B.   Potential Solutions to Combat Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking 
in the Face of CDA Preemption 
States have litigation and legislation options to stop minor sex trafficking 
online despite CDA preemption.  Since the enactment of the CDA, a 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. See, e.g., Gregory M. Dickinson, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity 
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 863 
(2010); Matthew G. Jeweler, The Communications Decency Act of 1996:  Why § 230 Is 
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Interactive Service Provider Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 2003 B.C. 
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 232. See Dickinson, supra note 231, at 874. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 110–11.  Larkin notes:  ―every court which has granted 
immunity under Section 230 has noted the impossibility of manually reviewing each post for 
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justification. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Quist, supra note 183, at 296 (noting that ―insomuch as [limited immunity] 
embraces the limited goal of incentivizing content monitoring under the CDA, it remains 
logically consistent‖ with congressional intent). 
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number of legal scholars, courts, and other interested parties have suggested 
that a change in the CDA may be necessary to combat minor sex trafficking 
online.  Part III.B.1 examines the litigation strategies states may employ to 
hold websites such as Backpage.com liable for permitting prostitution 
advertising on its ―adult‖ section.  Part III.B.2 outlines the legislative 
options that Congress has to permit states to effectively combat sex 
trafficking online. 
1.   Litigation Options 
Legal scholars have examined the possible litigation strategies that can 
be pursued against websites such as Backpage.com.238  In the face of CDA 
preemption of inconsistent state criminal laws, such as the statutes at issue 
in the Backpage.com litigation, these strategies may prove useful in helping 
hold websites criminally accountable for posting minor sex trafficking 
advertisements. 
One of the stated policy goals of § 230 is ―to ensure vigorous 
enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.‖239  With this in 
mind, Congress expressly created an exception to CDA immunity under 
federal law.240  Therefore, the strongest avenue of criminal prosecution 
against Backpage.com and other websites may be through federal law.241 
Prosecutors may have success by charging Backpage.com under federal 
obscenity law.242  One of the expressly exempted federal laws, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1465, criminalizes the knowing production with the intent to transport, or 
the knowing transportation, of an interactive computer service for the 
purpose of the sale or distribution of obscene media.243  Advertisements in 
Backpage.com‘s ―adult‖ section often contain obscene images and text, thus 
constituting obscene media under the statute.244  Because Backpage.com 
admits to manually filtering the posts in its adult section, ―mens rea will be 
 
 238. See generally Larkin, supra note 62 (discussing prosecution strategies for civil and 
criminal liability); see also Ashley Ingber, Cyber Crime Control:  Will Websites Ever Be 
Held Accountable for the Legal Activities They Profit from?, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 
423, 441–45 (2012) (discussing different prosecution options for liability under criminal 
law). 
 239. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (2012). 
 240. Id. § 230(e)(1) (―No effect on criminal law. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to 
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18 or any other Federal 
criminal statute.‖). 
 241. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 95. 
 242. See id. 
 243. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (2012); see also Larkin, supra note 62, at 95 (discussing 
prosecution under obscenity); Lawrence G. Walters, Shooting the Messenger:  An Analysis 
of Theories of Criminal Liability Used Against Adult-Themed Online Service Providers, 23 
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 244. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at Ex. A (displaying Backpage.com 
advertisements including promiscuous pictures and text). 
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all but a non-issue,‖ and criminal liability may follow.245  However, there is 
little case law thus far to support the use of § 1465 against corporate 
website operators. 
Prosecutors may also look to prosecute Backpage.com under an 
accomplice liability theory of aiding and abetting prostitution.246  Under 18 
U.S.C. § 2, a defendant is punishable as a principal if he or she ―aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces or procures‖ or ―willfully causes an act to be 
done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense 
against the United States.‖247  In theory, if Backpage.com knowingly 
published an advertisement for prostitution depicting a minor, it could be 
liable for the same crime as the original third-party poster under the federal 
prostitution statute.248  However, it will be a significant challenge to prove 
that Backpage.com aided or ―willfully caused‖ prostitution under the 
federal statute because proving knowledge will be difficult given the 
volume of advertisements Backpage.com reviewers see each day.249 
Prosecutors may also be successful in charging Backpage.com under 
federal child pornography laws.250  According to a symposium article by 
scholar Lawrence Walters, under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, the government must 
prove: 
(1) The defendant knowingly received or possessed an item or items of 
child pornography, as charged; 
(2) Such items of child pornography had been transported, shipped or 
mailed in interstate or foreign commerce, including by computer; and 
(3) At the time of such reception or possession of the materials, the 
defendant believed that such items constituted or contained child 
pornography.251 
Thus, the government may be able to prove these elements by showing 
that Backpage.com allowed third parties to post sexual advertisements 
depicting pornographic images of minors, especially because these laws do 
not specifically require proof of defendant‘s knowledge of the minor‘s 
age.252  Nevertheless, prosecutors will still face the challenge of proving 
 
 245. Larkin, supra note 62, at 97; see also supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text 
(discussing Backpage.com‘s review procedures). 
 246. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 97; see also Ingber, supra note 238, at 444 (discussing 
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 251. Id. 
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that this posting was made knowingly given the vast amount of posts 
reviewed by Backpage.com staff each day.253  Further, there is a safe harbor 
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2258A, which would immunize Backpage.com from 
liability when good faith policing efforts were taken to report child 
exploitation.254  Backpage.com clearly has demonstrated its efforts to report 
offenses to federal authorities and would thus likely find immunity from a 
child pornography charge under this federal provision.255 
When predicting the success of these prosecutions, it becomes clear that 
Backpage.com and other interactive computer services will not bear 
responsibility for minor sex trafficking on their sites ―unless either 
legislatures reform the language of Section 230 to explicitly allow for 
criminal liability, or judges start interpreting and enforcing it 
differently.‖256  Therefore, although states may be able to encourage federal 
prosecution of Backpage.com under the aforementioned laws, legislative 
change is necessary to truly hold websites responsible for sex trafficking. 
2.   Legislative Options 
Litigation options will likely be ineffective in holding sites like 
Backpage.com responsible for its users‘ posts, and most state legislation is 
preempted by the CDA.257  Therefore, Congress could act to amendthe 
CDA,  slightly curtailing CDA immunity for interactive computer services 
while giving plaintiffs and state legislatures some ability to combat minor 
sex trafficking online.  Part III.B.2.a discusses an amendment to the CDA 
that incorporates the  notice-and-takedown model of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).  Part III.B.2.b examines the attorneys general‘s 
suggestions for a CDA amendment.  Part III.B.2.c describes an amendment 
to the CDA exempting all state human trafficking and prostitution laws. 
a.   CDA Amendment Incorporating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s 
Notice-and-Takedown Model 
In a note for the New York University Annual Survey of American Law, 
David Lukmire suggested that the notice-and-takedown model used in 
applying the DMCA would be effective in applying the CDA.258  The 
DMCA provides a liability shield for interactive computer services for 
copyright-infringing content posted by third parties if the websites do not 
have knowledge of infringement.259  The DMCA also provides that a 
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website cannot be liable if ―upon notification of claimed 
infringement . . . [it] responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, 
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing 
activity.‖260 
If Congress amended the CDA to include a similar notice-and-takedown 
provision, it would provide a limited safe harbor for websites.261  There are 
two conflicting viewpoints regarding the effectiveness of this limited 
immunity.  Some argue that if a website were given notice of a defamatory 
or otherwise offensive posting, the website would be incentivized to remove 
postings to maintain immunity under the notice-and-takedown 
amendment.262  Thus, congressional intent behind the CDA immunity 
would be preserved because offensive postings would be removed.263  On 
the other hand, some argue that websites would be incentivized not to 
police the content on their website so as to avoid ―knowingly‖ permitting 
infringed material to be posted and would instead merely wait for 
notification of offensive content.264 
b.   CDA Amendment to § 230(e)(1) Exempting All State Criminal Laws 
The attorneys general of forty-nine states recommended that Congress 
amend the CDA to exempt all state criminal laws from its purview, as 
previously only federal criminal laws were exempt.265  By adding two 
words—―or State‖—the attorneys general argue that Congress can restore 
local authorities‘ ―traditional jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those 
who promote prostitution and endanger our children.‖266  Those who 
support a CDA amendment note that the modification would only create 
liability for illegal and injurious posted content.267  Therefore, eliminating 
preemption of state criminal laws will give states an opportunity to combat 
minor sex trafficking at a local level within their state. 
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In response, the ACLU and other interest groups penned a letter to 
Congress strongly opposing the suggestion by the attorneys general to 
amend the CDA.268  These critics argued that this amendment would 
dramatically reduce free expression online and plague websites with ―open-
ended legal risk‖ from individualized state criminal statutes.269  Thus, when 
faced with expensive and inconsistent obligations from state laws, 
opponents argue that websites will be forced to comply with the most 
restrictive statutes or shut down.270  Critics also argue that this amendment 
is unnecessary.271  The CDA only bars inconsistent state laws,272 and states 
can enact criminal laws to combat minor sex trafficking and prosecute the 
actual traffickers or any ―service providers who actually aid and abet the 
illegal conduct of others.‖273  In concluding their criticism, the signers 
acknowledged the problem of sex trafficking and encouraged cooperation 
between Congress, the attorneys general, and the internet community, but 
they did not yet propose a specific amendment or suggestion for change.274 
c.   CDA Amendment to § 230(e) Exempting 
State Human Trafficking and Prostitution Laws 
The CDA already includes a number of important exceptions for different 
laws that Congress felt § 230 immunity should not affect.275  An 
amendment to the CDA creating an additional carve-out for human 
trafficking and prostitution laws may be an effective way to permit states to 
act without eliminating civil liability altogether.276  Abby Perer proposed a 
―Commercial Sex Distribution Amendment‖ to the CDA where an 
interactive computer service ―would become a distributor once local or 
national law enforcement officials alerted the provider to the presence of 
illegal sex-sales ads‖ and traditional distributor liability would apply from 
there.277  This, she argued, would force websites to take responsibility for 
third-party commercial sex advertisements and preserve the underlying 
policy goals of the CDA by treating websites as distributors, not 
publishers.278 
Most critics of this amendment argued that it would crush free speech on 
the internet.279  The court in Zeran also directly rejected this distinction and 
held that distributor liability is merely a subset of publisher liability 
precluded by § 230.280  Further, the court noted that distributor liability 
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would require that interactive computer services review all postings to 
avoid liability, which would prove challenging given the large number of 
postings on the internet.281 
Regardless of the variation of amendment selected, the greatest challenge 
of all for states will be encouraging Congress to act and amend the CDA.282 
IV.   THE BEST SOLUTIONS IN THE FACE OF CDA PREEMPTION: 
THE CASE FOR NARROWER IMMUNITY AND A FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTE 
The unresolved questions are:  First, should the CDA be broadly 
interpreted to preempt state laws.  Second, if states are confronted with 
CDA preemption, what is the best course of action to effectively combat 
minor sex trafficking online?  Part IV of this Note attempts to reconcile this 
conflict by arguing for a narrower interpretation of the CDA and a change 
in the law.  Part IV.A argues that a narrower interpretation of the CDA is 
desirable given the development of the internet and the prevalence of minor 
sex trafficking online.  Part IV.B proposes a federal criminal statute that 
punishes the knowing publication of online commercial sex advertisements 
depicting minors that will effectively combat minor sex trafficking while 
maintaining free speech and uniformity of law on the internet. 
A.   The Advantages of Narrowly Interpreting CDA Immunity 
When Congress initially enacted the CDA, the internet was a new and 
burgeoning medium filled with uncertainty.283  At the time, there were few 
laws regulating the internet, and Congress recognized a problem with the 
availability of obscene material online to children.284  Congress also 
understood the large differences between the internet and traditional print, 
recognizing the internet‘s potential as a forum for both speech and 
commerce.285  Therefore, in enacting the CDA, Congress attempted to 
reconcile these purposes by creating civil immunity for interactive computer 
services, those providers that hosted third-party content.286  By providing 
immunity from civil suits traditionally faced by print media, such as 
defamation, to those who merely provided website services and did not 
create content, Congress hoped to encourage providers to self-police their 
websites for obscene content.287  When considering the numerous 
exceptions from immunity Congress included in § 230, there is little 
evidence that Congress realized or intended the expansive immunity that 
has resulted from circuit court interpretations of these key definitions:  
―interactive computer services‖ and ―information content provider.‖288  The 
distinction between the two is at the heart of the debate and determines 
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which websites are liable for third-party content and which are immune 
under the CDA.289 
In effect, the majority of circuit courts provide immunity under the CDA 
to a variety of websites and internet hosts that walk a fine line between 
providing and creating content.290  Although immunity is appropriate in 
cases where third parties are solely responsible for creating the defamatory 
content, extending this immunity to those websites that engage in 
substantial modification of this content is inapposite and beyond Congress‘s 
intent in enacting the CDA.291 
The internet has changed significantly since 1996 and is now an 
established medium with the capability of surviving under more restrictive 
regulation.292  Now, the internet is a robust and developed technology that 
can still flourish despite more regulation and liability, similar to regulation 
of print media.293  Yet print media engaged in the same traditional 
publishing functions do not have blanket immunity from all civil suits.294  
Because posting online is more accessible for third-party users than 
publishing in print media, the laws for each cannot be identical.295  
Congress considered these differences in choosing to grant civil immunity 
to interactive computer services that merely publish third-party content.296  
The current expansive interpretation, however, provides too much freedom 
to websites and internet hosts, such as Backpage.com, which post 
potentially illegal content with no repercussions.297 
Narrowing the interpretation of an ―interactive computer service‖ offers a 
number of advantages.  First, a narrower interpretation would more 
effectively assign responsibility to websites capable of removing 
defamatory and criminal content.  Given the current state of technology that 
has led to a surge in cyberbullying, commercial sex advertisements, and 
other immoral or illegal content, this shifting responsibility is increasingly 
important.298  In the digital age, as exemplified by Backpage.com‘s current 
monitoring efforts, monitoring content is much easier and less costly for 
websites in part due to advancements in keyword searching and filtering 
technology.299  Holding websites accountable as information content 
providers for knowingly publishing third-party content that is criminal in 
nature is not so burdensome as to cripple e-commerce and chill free 
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speech.300  As a result, scrutinizing internet publishing and narrowing the 
definition of an immune interactive computer service would better regulate 
a now-mature technology by holding those websites that extensively edit 
and post third-party-created defamatory or criminal material liable as 
―information content providers.‖301 
Second, a narrower interpretation of the CDA would give plaintiffs and 
prosecutors the tools to pursue justice when interactive computer services 
deliberately act in an unlawful manner.302  If the courts applied a narrower 
interpretation of CDA immunity in the litigation against Backpage.com, the 
courts may have found Backpage.com liable under the CDA for 
encouraging illegal content on its website.303 
B.   The Legislative Solution:  A Federal Criminal Statute 
The ideal way to achieve a narrower interpretation of the CDA—and 
combat domestic minor sex trafficking online—is to change federal law.  
Legislative action is more likely to succeed than judicial action, because 
websites that do not create or substantially modify content may still qualify 
for immunity, even under the Ninth Circuit‘s approach in Roommates.com. 
Scholars have made numerous suggestions for what a legislative change 
should look like and how it should affect the internet regulatory scheme.304  
This Note proposes a new federal criminal statute that provides a uniform 
standard for websites to follow and avoids preemption by the CDA, with 
the same practical effect as those enacted by Washington, Tennessee, and 
New Jersey.  This new federal statute would criminalize the knowing 
publication of online minor sex trafficking advertisements for traffickers 
who purchased advertising space and websites who knowingly publish or 
fail to take down advertisements despite having notice of illegality. 
While it is true that the attorneys general‘s suggestion to eliminate 
preemption for all state law criminal claims would give states more power 
at a local level to combat trafficking, the amendment presents a number of 
problems for websites and other service providers because of the internet‘s 
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global nature.305  Even with the existing technological advances, requiring 
websites to comply with inconsistent state laws for any crime would be 
burdensome.306  Moreover, because some states have criminal defamation 
laws, an exemption for all state criminal laws would open the floodgates to 
liability for the exact claim Congress intended to immunize.307 
Additionally, an amendment to the CDA to exempt state laws specific to 
sex crimes, such as minor sex trafficking, would not resolve all of the 
problems presented by the attorneys general‘s suggestion either.308  While 
websites would not be open to extensive liability for all crimes, they would 
still be required to comply with fifty states‘ sex crimes laws.309  Although 
these criminal statutes appear similar in ways, websites still must comply 
with all state laws because of the global scope of the internet.310  The 
internet does not recognize state borders in the same way print and other 
media can, and thus, websites like Backpage.com are open to liability from 
all states unless a geographic limitation is placed on its offerings and 
advertisements.311  This type of limitation would cripple speech.312  
Therefore, an amendment to the CDA exempting only state sex crime laws 
would be ineffective and overly burdensome.313  Thus, the aforementioned 
suggestions have a number of limitations that lead to overbreadth and 
insufficiency and show that an amendment to the CDA may not be the right 
solution. 
This Note proposes a better and more effective legislative solution:  a 
federal statute criminalizing the knowing publication of online commercial 
sex advertisements of minors.  A federal statute modeled after the 
Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey state laws would have many 
advantages over individual state laws while still punishing those websites 
that knowingly publish illicit advertisements.314 
This federal criminal statute regulating online sex advertisements of 
minors would be exempt from CDA immunity.315  Under § 230(e), the 
CDA expressly exempts all federal criminal laws.316  This statute therefore 
resolves the preemption challenge states have faced in the district court 
cases addressed in Part II of this Note.317  Further, because these statutes 
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have been tested in the district courts, Congress can learn from the mistakes 
made by state legislatures and draft a federal statute that resolves the First 
Amendment vagueness and overbreadth concerns raised by Backpage.com 
and other websites.318  A federal statute can regulate interstate commerce 
online and thus resolve the Commerce Clause issues argued in the district 
courts.319 
This federal criminal statute would punish those who knowingly publish 
online sex advertisements.  It directly furthers the states‘ goal of combating 
minor trafficking on online classifieds such as Backpage.com.320  By 
eliminating mistake of age as a defense, a federal criminal statute would 
encourage companies to better monitor their posts and provide some form 
of age verification.321  This statute furthers the states‘ mission to fight 
online sex trafficking.  It also furthers Congress‘s intent by encouraging 
self-policing of obscene and illicit content online.322  Self-policing 
continues to be an important goal today, as evidenced by the 
recommendations for reform raised by senators and representatives.323 
To ensure the continuation of content hosting on the internet, this federal 
criminal statute would effectively reduce the risk of liability for websites 
and other interactive computer services by including a notice-and-takedown 
provision, similar to the DMCA.324  Given that Backpage.com and many 
other websites already use technology and manual review to screen third-
party postings, this model would be easy to implement.325  Further, the 
statute is limited to content that advertises sex acts with minors.326  Thus, 
sites that do not host punishable content, such as those run by small 
businesses and retailers, will not be impacted by this statute.327  Lastly, this 
notice-and-takedown model gives websites an opportunity to avoid liability 
by taking down the offensive content and reporting the sex trafficking of 
minors, something that many websites such as Backpage.com already 
purport to do.328  However, it would still permit prosecution of websites 
that knowingly post such advertisements or fail to remove illegal content.329 
This federal criminal statute is not without flaws.  It will not effectively 
address the problem at a local level by giving states the power to enact 
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individual legislation; however, that approach is inapt given the global 
scope of the internet and its cross-border impact.  It may also contain 
loopholes that permit Backpage.com and other websites to host some minor 
sex trafficking advertisements without consequence.  Nevertheless, by 
creating a manageable and effective regulatory model for online 
advertisements, a federal criminal statute will further the states‘ interests in 
combating minor sex trafficking at the source, while balancing the concerns 
of internet providers and other interest groups. 
CONCLUSION 
Minor sex trafficking is a growing problem in the United States.  The 
explosion of classified advertisements on the internet provides a new outlet 
for traffickers to find customers for prostitution and sexual exploitation.  
Although these websites, such as Backpage.com, claim to monitor ―adult 
entertainment‖ postings, advertisements are hardly censored and posters‘ 
ages are taken at face value.  Change is necessary to control these illegal 
advertisements, and states may be better situated to address this growing 
problem.  However, courts‘ broad interpretation of the CDA effectively 
preempts states from passing legislation to take steps toward a solution. 
Although changes in society and the maturing of the internet dictate that 
a narrower interpretation of the CDA is appropriate, courts are unlikely to 
change their interpretation because of strong judicial precedent favoring 
immunity.  With federal preemption creating barriers for state legislation, 
states are left with few options.  States can continue to enact creative 
criminal statutes that narrowly avoid preemption or attempt to prosecute 
these websites under federal law.  The most effective resolution, however, 
comes from Congress in the form of a federal statute criminalizing the 
advertising of commercial sex acts depicting minors.  A federal statute will 
provide a uniform law for websites to follow while still taking steps to 
combat minor sex trafficking online.  Congress can build upon the states‘ 
experiences to draft improved legislation that resolves the constitutional 
challenges states in district court litigation face.  Further, including a notice-
and-takedown provision will allow Backpage.com and other websites to 
avoid liability by removing known minor sex trafficking advertisements.  
By enacting this federal criminal statute, Congress and the states will 
together make strides to protect America‘s children from victimization and 
online sex trafficking. 
